states who are struggling with these questions, Booker's 118 pages and six opinions offer little clarity.
3 Nonetheless, the Booker decision sheds some light on the Blakely rule and sharpens its implications for certain states' structured sentencing systems.
4
Preliminarily, it is important to stress one thing the Booker rulings do not do. They do not call into question the practice of proving to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt the facts that can justify an enhanced sentence. This practice, known as jury fact-finding, has emerged as the most commonly considered response to Blakely in the states. Even though
Booker rejected jury fact-finding for the federal system, it made clear that the method satisfies Blakely's constitutional requirements. 5 Consequently, states that are considering this option need not change course.
Here is what we know after Booker. First, the legal source of a sentencing rule (that is, whether it was created by a
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Once again the Supreme Court has thrown a sizeable wrench into the national sentencing machinery. As with its decision in Blakely v. Washington, however, the Court's latest pronouncements in United States v. Booker may cause less lasting trauma than the sweeping ruling might suggest. For the states, Booker's implications-as well as its illuminating power-are modest. For the federal system, there is reason to believe that the decision might prove a workable result.
Blakely provoked an initial wave of worry across states as many jurisdictions scrambled to determine if they were implicated by the Court's extension of Sixth Amendment jurytrial protections. After some anxiety, most decided (correctly, it seems) that the ruling did not affect their sentencing systems. The jurisdictions unable to make that claim have, for the most part, been calmly constructing policy alternatives designed to satisfy the Court's rule while not unraveling the entirety of their sentencing regimes. Many such alternatives will undoubtedly be considered and passed in the legislative sessions underway in statehouses across the country. This is not so for federal sentencing. The immediate chaos of Blakely was amplified on the federal level because of that system's reliance on judicial fact-finding in the vast majority of sentences imposed. The lower federal courts divided as to whether Blakely even applied in the federal context and, if it did, what would be the proper response. Booker has brought some clarity to this fog but at the cost of the federal system as we knew it. The Court made a system that was binding on judges into one that they need not follow. But voluntary guidelines create a vacuum that Congress may abhor and the temptation for legislative action will be great.
A look at the state experience, however, suggests that hasty congressional action may not be required. A number of states have embraced voluntary sentencing guidelines and appear to be satisfied with their ability to promote public safety while balancing other concerns of judicial discretion, fairness, and cost. The collection and use of objective data to inform thoughtful bipartisan deliberation has been a hallmark of sentencing policymaking in many of these states. While there are big differences between federal and state models, there is little reason to think that the federal system would not also benefit from adherence to such principles. Time is needed for such study and, with state examples counseling that rigor and safety need not be sacrificed when judges are given more latitude in sentencing, it may be appropriate to take the time. 
Glossary
The following definitions reflect their usage in this paper.
Structured sentencing system: a system providing some form of recommended sentences within statutory sentence ranges.
Sentencing guidelines system: procedures to guide sentencing decisions and a system of multiple, recommended sentences based generally on a calculation of the severity of the offense committed and the criminal history of the offender.
Presumptive sentencing guidelines: sentencing guidelines that require a judge to impose the recommended (presumptive) sentence or one within a recommended range, or provide justification for imposing a different sentence.
Voluntary sentencing guidelines: sentencing guidelines that do not require a judge to impose a recommended sentence, but may require the judge to provide justification for imposing a different sentence.
Enhanced sentence: a sentence greater than the maximum sentence authorized for an offense based solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict or formally admitted by the defendant.
Determinate sentencing system: a system in which there is no discretionary releasing authority and a defendant may be released from prison only after expiration of the sentence imposed (less available good time).
Indeterminate sentencing system: a system in which a discretionary releasing authority, such as a parole board, may release a defendant from prison prior to expiration of the sentence imposed.
Even though Booker rejected jury fact-finding for the federal system, it made clear that the method satisfies Blakely's constitutional requirements. 
By restating the rule-and avoiding the troubling term-the
Booker court appears to be striving for greater clarity.
There is another significant problem of language in 
Voluntary Sentencing Guidelines: Approved and Clarified
If there was any doubt that a voluntary (or, as the Court terms it, "advisory") structured sentencing system complies with the Sixth Amendment, Booker resolves it. The Court creates for the federal system a regime of voluntary sentencing guidelines by removing the requirement that judges apply the guidelines' analyses and ranges. The Court is clear that this does not nullify the guidelines structure but rather transforms it into one in which judges must "consult," "take account of," or "consider" the guidelines factors and sentence
The Source of the Legal Rule: A Distinction Rejected
The Court clearly resolved one lingering question raised by
Blakely when it determined that the source of the legal rule that constrains a judge's sentencing discretion is not a factor in deciding whether the jury fact-finding requirement applies.
In Blakely, as in prior cases, the sentencing provision at issue was created by statute. The decision did not directly address whether a different source of the legal rule might provide a refuge from the Sixth Amendment requirement.
Indeed, the Court's reference to "statutory maximum"
sentences led some to believe that only rules created by statute triggered Blakely.
In Booker, the government argued that federal sentencing rulemaking. There may be arguments in any given state that this distinction is more relevant than it is in the federal structure. It now appears more clearly than before, however, that the source of the rule creating a sentencing threshold is irrelevant so long as the rule has the force and effect of law.
Appellate review
It is possible that a sentencing threshold set out by an appellate court, rather than by the legislature or an administrative body, also may trigger application of the 
Traditional Sentencing Findings: A Cautionary Tale
The dissenting justices in Blakely, and subsequent commentators, focused on the difficulty judges and prosecutors would face in submitting certain sentencing factors for jury determination. In particular, many wondered whether the rule was meant to encompass general sentencing determinations such as whether an enhanced sentence was necessary for the protection of the public or was appropriate given the nature of the offense or character of the defendant.
For those in presumptive structured sentencing states that rely on jury fact-finding for enhanced sentences, the Booker decision provides both some possible clarification on this issue and a note of caution.
The remedial opinion discusses the federal statute that requires judges to consider the "nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant" in deciding an appropriate sentence. The Court strongly implies that this provision would be unconstitutional in a presumptive guidelines regime, unless jury fact-finding was used. 20 The broader implication is that even such broad sentencing factors must be proved to a jury if they are to be The most significant such doctrine for most states is harmless error analysis. It is now clear that there is no constitutional obstacle to a state's denying re-sentencing to a defendant whose sentence violated the Blakely rule where it has been determined that the violation was harmless.
Although state law may control the scope and applicability of such a doctrine, it generally requires a showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant would have received the same sentence had the rule requiring jury fact-finding been followed. Of course, it is difficult to know how often such a determination can or will be made in practice.
Issues not Addressed in Booker:
The Ball Is in the State Courts We are also left with an unfortunate effect of the Court's remedial opinion. The federal circuit courts of appeals, which often provide additional clarity and nuance to the Supreme Court's broader edicts, will not have the direct opportunity to resolve the issues that arise in presumptive structured sentencing systems. This is because the federal system, at least for the time being, is itself no longer such a system. 
Booker.
7. Justice Ginsburg joined the four dissenters on the substantive question to form a majority on the remedial question. 11. The key issue here is whether a limitation on the minimum term of an indeterminate sentence-the term that controls eligibility for parole release-creates a sentencing threshold for Blakely purposes. Is jury fact-finding required to justify a sentence that delays a defendant's eligibility for release beyond the time he or she would have been required to serve under the highest presumptive minimum term? The Court has not had the opportunity to address the question through the application of the Apprendi line of cases to an indeterminate system.
